Roadmap / 0.1.2.13
A second war against a US ally
v0.1.2.13, commit 35e0d48. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.13_second_war.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.
Switch: second_war.enabled.
Options: start_month (unset = monthly hazard, 0 = never, N = forced), theatre (draw, europe, pacific, korea, middle_east), us_response (draw, defend, abandon).
Runs: 3,000 paired runs per variant, every other module on except allied air. 23 tests pass; all harness checks pass.
Scope: aggregate and strategic only. Theatres are regions; no attacker is named and nothing is modelled inside the second war.
The question
While the US is committed in Canada, another state attacks a US ally. Does the US still have allies to defend, and what does defending or abandoning them do to the war in Canada?
How the module works
- When. A base hazard of 0.1–0.8% a month, multiplied up to 4× by how tied down the US is in Canada and up to 4× by how far its allies have broken with it. That gives a second war in 33% of full-annexation runs, 20% of Alberta runs and 17% of coercion runs, on average around month 17 to 27.
- Where. Europe 35%, Pacific 35%, Middle East 20%, Korea 10%.
- Whether the US defends. 40–85% if the alliance is intact, scaled down by how many of that region's allies have sanctioned the US. This is the "if the US still has any" term: a Europe that has closed its bases to Washington is defended less often.
- If it defends: 12–35% of sustainable ground forces and 30–55% of air power leave Canada, the US economy takes a second hit (1–5% of GDP a year, largest for the Pacific), the monthly pressure to get out of Canada rises 1.5–4×, and US support for the Canada war shifts by −3 to +6 points (a rally is possible).
- If it stays out: no forces move, the economy takes half the hit, and US support drops 0–5 points.
- Europe is special. A Europe at war sends 50–95% less materiel and forces to Canada. If the US defends it, Europeans drop their sanctions and basing limits 20–80% of the time ("reconciliation").
- The second war lasts 3–36 months.
All of these are my estimates.
Results (chance the US quits Canada; change vs no second war, 95% interval)
| Variant | Full annexation | Alberta detachment | Economic coercion |
|---|---|---|---|
| No second war | 67.6% | 55.2% | 31.2% |
| Hazard as modelled (starts in 33% / 20% / 17% of runs) | +1.9 (1.4 to 2.4) | +1.5 (1.0 to 2.1) | +3.2 (2.5 to 3.8) |
| Forced at month 6, theatre and response drawn | +4.0 (3.2 to 4.7) | +6.8 (5.7 to 7.9) | +15.6 (14.2 to 17.1) |
| Europe, US defends | +8.7 (7.6 to 9.9) | +5.9 (4.7 to 7.2) | +6.8 (5.5 to 8.1) |
| Europe, US stays out | −0.5 (−0.8 to −0.2) | +3.0 (2.2 to 3.7) | +9.9 (8.8 to 11.0) |
| Pacific, US defends | +10.0 (8.9 to 11.1) | +15.7 (14.3 to 17.1) | +31.3 (29.5 to 33.1) |
| Pacific, US stays out | +0.1 (0.0 to 0.2) | +6.2 (5.3 to 7.1) | +16.8 (15.5 to 18.2) |
| Korea, US defends | +10.1 (9.0 to 11.2) | +10.8 (9.6 to 12.1) | +14.9 (13.4 to 16.5) |
| Middle East, US defends | +9.9 (8.9 to 11.0) | +8.2 (7.0 to 9.4) | +7.2 (5.9 to 8.5) |
| Pacific at month 24, US defends | +4.2 (3.5 to 4.9) | +8.6 (7.6 to 9.7) | +30.0 (28.2 to 31.7) |
Forced wars start in 83% of occupation runs and 94% of coercion runs; in the rest the Canada war is already over by month 6.
Other effects of a defended second war at month 6 (full annexation): US military deaths in Canada fall by 550 to 650 and the war shortens from 24 to 17 months, because the US leaves sooner. When the US defends Europe, Europeans reconcile with it in about half of those runs (41% of all runs).
Switch effect with everything on (all on vs all on minus this switch): +2.1 full annexation, +1.9 Alberta, +3.2 coercion.
What it means
- A second war is good for Canada in almost every variant. The US cannot hold Canada and fight elsewhere without the pressure to leave Canada rising sharply. The effect at the modelled hazard is small (2 to 3 points) only because the war is unlikely in any given run.
- A Pacific war helps Canada most, because it costs the US economy most (5% of GDP a year) and takes the most air power. In the coercion scenario, where money is the whole contest, it raises the chance the US gives up by 31 points.
- Europe is the one case that can hurt Canada. If Europe is attacked and the US stays out, Canada loses European materiel and gains nothing: −0.5 points in full annexation. If the US defends Europe, Canada still gains (+8.7), but less than from other theatres, because Europe stops supplying Canada and half the time lifts its sanctions on the US. Canada's allies trade Canada for their own defence.
- Abandoning an ally costs the US little inside this model during an occupation (0 to +6 points) and more in coercion (+10 to +17), where the economic hit still lands. That is a limit of the model more than a finding; see below.
- Timing matters less than whether it happens. A Pacific war at month 24 reaches fewer full-annexation runs (34% are still going) but hits coercion as hard as one at month 6.
Limits
- Abandonment has no alliance consequences. If the US leaves one ally undefended, every other ally should re-rate its own guarantee, some toward Washington (hedging) and some away. The NATO member model does not react to it. This is the largest gap.
- The second war's attacker is not an actor: it does not choose its moment beyond the opportunism hazard, and the war has no outcome.
- A rally in US opinion applies to the Canada war as a single lasting shift; a second war could as easily make the Canada war look like the wrong war.
- Only one second war per run.
- No nuclear dimension.
- Canada's own obligations (for example to a NATO ally under attack) are not modelled.