Roadmap / 0.1.2.4
Oil
v0.1.2.4, commit b942724. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.4_oil.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.
Switches: oil.enabled (off by default; when off the engine uses each scenario's old flat economics.oil_lost_mbd), oil.embargo (Canada stops crude to the US), oil.us_cuts_east (the US stops Line 5 transit and its crude exports to eastern Canada), oil.basin_in_objective, oil.basin_share.
Runs: 2,000 per variant, seed 20261105; weather, seasonal insurgency, DMP mobilization and potash (no embargo) on. Backtests unchanged (Iraq invasion 156 vs 139; occupation 3,546 vs 3,500). 12 tests pass.
What the module adds
Canada sent 3.9 Mb/d of crude to the US in 2025: 90% of its crude exports, worth C$126B, and 63% of US crude imports (CER). Midwest refineries run 73% Canadian crude and cannot easily replace it, because they are landlocked and Capline was reversed in 2021 (Kansas City Fed; S&P Global). Trans Mountain, Canada's only non-US outlet, is ~94% full (RBN, Aug 2026). In the other direction, Line 5 crosses Michigan and supplies more than half of Ontario's refinery crude and, through Line 9, about two-thirds of Quebec's; New Brunswick and Quebec also import US crude.
The module replaces the old flat oil number with five parts: - Flows. Crude reaches the US from whatever part of the Alberta–Saskatchewan basin the US holds, at 40–85% of output, plus whatever war disruption or an embargo lets through. - World price. Barrels that stop flowing are mostly shut in, so they leave the world market. Spare capacity, demand response and an SPR release offset part of the loss. - US politics. Higher gasoline prices lower US support: 0.6 points per 10 cents (Harbridge, Krosnick & Wooldridge 2016), capped because the effect saturates (Gupta et al. 2025). This is a level effect, not cumulative. - Canadian costs. An embargo forfeits revenue beyond ordinary disruption. A US cut to eastern supply hits Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick refining until seaborne crude covers part of the gap. Canada's remaining offshore sales gain from the price spike. - The basin as a prize. A US-held Alberta keeps some oil flowing south.
Aggregates only: no pipeline-segment, facility or terminal-level detail.
Results (chance the US quits)
| Scenario | old flat oil | oil on | Canada embargo | US cuts east | both | both + potash embargo |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic coercion | 24.0% | 31.4% | 37.0% | 31.2% | 35.8% | 42.0% |
| Alberta detachment | 47.3% | 48.7% | 49.2% | 49.4% | 47.2% | 50.6% |
| Full annexation, manufactured rally | 17.4% | 20.1% | 21.2% | 20.4% | 21.0% | 22.9% |
| Full annexation, no casus belli | 63.2% | 64.4% | 61.4% | 65.7% | 64.6% | 61.4% |
US success in coercion stays at 14–15% in every variant; the shift is from "unresolved" to "US gives up". Median peaks in economic coercion with a Canadian embargo: world price +$20/bbl, US gasoline +70¢/gal, US support down 4 points from gasoline alone. The same embargo costs Canada about US$92B in lost revenue over five years, roughly 0.8% of GDP a year — about 30 times the cost of a potash embargo.
Findings
- Oil is Canada's biggest economic lever, but only when the US hasn't taken Alberta. In coercion an oil embargo raises the chance the US gives up from 24% to 37%, and to 42% stacked with potash.
- The old flat oil number was too pessimistic for the US in war. With an SPR release and markets adjusting, the US's peak GDP loss in full annexation falls from 1.8% to 1.5%, yet US withdrawal still rises, because gasoline prices hit opinion directly.
- Invading Alberta defuses Canada's two biggest economic levers, oil and potash. In Alberta detachment, oil adds only about 1–2 points. The model now gives the US a clear reason to move on the Prairies first.
- Eastern Canada's fuel depends on a pipeline through Michigan. A US cut takes out ~65% of eastern refinery crude at first and adds 1–1.5 points to Canada's peak GDP loss. It barely moves outcomes in the model, but that is because Canadian capitulation responds weakly to economic pain — the model's weakest relationship, not evidence that the vulnerability doesn't matter.
- An embargo is expensive and lands on Alberta. The model doesn't yet ask whether Albertans would accept it. That is a backlog item and could reverse the sign in Alberta detachment.
Weakest parameters
price_per_mbd, market_adjust_*, occupied_output, east_gdp_weight, east_substitution_*, approval_cap; the Canadian capitulation link to GDP loss.
Backlog this opens
- Alberta political response to an embargo (separatism, provincial non-cooperation).
- Natural gas: Ontario and Quebec import ~half their gas from the US (CAPP); Canada supplies ~100% of US gas imports.
- Electricity exports (Quebec and Manitoba hydro) as their own module.
- Scorched earth and sabotage on the basin as a degradation category (aggregate effect only).
- A US naval interdiction of the St. Lawrence would close the eastern seaborne substitute (links to the St. Lawrence vignette).
Sources
Canada Energy Regulator, 2025 Canada–US energy trade snapshot (May 2026) and 2025 production snapshot (June 2026); EIA Today in Energy (29 July 2026); Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2025); S&P Global Commodity Insights (31 Jan 2025); Trans Mountain fact sheet (July 2026); RBN Energy (Aug 2026); CAPP, Canadian imports of US crude, natural gas and refined products (Jan 2025); Fraser Institute and Canadian government filings on Line 5; Harbridge, Krosnick & Wooldridge (2016); Gupta, Pierdzioch & Tiwari (2025).