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Roadmap / 0.1.2.5

Electricity exports

Version 0.1.2.5, 11 Nov 2026. tag v0.1.2.5, commit 8ecd55c. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.5_electricity.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.

Switches: electricity.enabled (off by default, neutral when off), electricity.canada_cut (Canada stops exports), electricity.us_cut (US stops exports to Canada), electricity.provinces_in_objective.
Runs: 2,000 per variant, seed 20261105; weather, seasonal insurgency, DMP mobilization, potash and oil (no embargoes) on. Backtests unchanged (Iraq invasion 160 vs 139; occupation 3,539 vs 3,500). 13 tests pass.
Bug fix: the US draft used to overwrite earlier lasting shifts in US support (rogue-incident rallies); it now adds to them. This affects only runs with both a draft and such shifts.

What the module adds

Canada exported 32.7 TWh to the US in 2025 (C$3.3B, 0.4% of its goods exports) and imported 22.1 TWh; it supplies 81% of US electricity imports (CER). That is under 1% of US consumption, but it is concentrated: - New York City: the Champlain Hudson Power Express (1,250 MW) can meet ~20% of the city's demand, in service since May 2026. - New England: net imports were 13% of supply in spring 2026 with NECEC, up from 7% (ISO-NE market monitor). - Ontario: exports serve ~1.5M US customers in New York, Michigan and Minnesota.

Two facts shape the lever: - Drought. Hydro-Québec exports fell from 36 TWh (2021) to 15 TWh (2024) on low runoff. - Winter. Quebec needs its own power in winter: it curtailed NECEC during Winter Storm Fern in January 2026.

Flows also run north. BC imported 25% of its needs in fiscal 2024's drought.

Historical analogue. Ontario's 25% export surcharge (10 March 2025) lasted one day. The US answer was to threaten doubled steel tariffs and a "National Emergency on Electricity" — escalation, not concession.

How the module works (aggregates only; no line, converter-station or substation detail): - Hydro condition: a per-run drought draw scales what Canada can export. - Season: the export lever is weakest in winter and strongest in summer heat. - Canadian cut: - a small, non-cumulative drag on US support and GDP in the import regions; - in peak months, a chance of an attributable blackout that shifts US opinion lastingly, either way. - US cut: - a Canadian GDP loss that rises in drought; - winter load-shedding risk. - Prize: when the US holds the exporting provinces, part of the exports keeps flowing.

Results (chance the US quits)

Scenario off on Canada cuts US cuts both all levers*
Economic coercion 33.3% 32.3% 31.4% 31.9% 31.9% 43.0%
Alberta detachment 46.2% 47.8% 46.2% 48.4% 47.8% 51.4%
Full annexation, manufactured rally 19.0% 19.6% 20.2% 18.8% 19.6% 23.0%
Full annexation, no casus belli 64.4% 63.8% 64.8% 64.5% 64.8% 63.3%

*All levers = both power cuts + oil embargo + US cut to eastern oil + potash embargo.

Blackout-attribution sensitivity (economic coercion, Canada cuts power):

If a blackout… US quits US wins unresolved
is blamed on the president (−3 pts support) 48.0% 12.6% 39.4%
has no lasting effect 32.9% 14.0% 53.1%
rallies the US behind the war (+4 pts) 23.1% 15.7% 61.3%

Findings

  1. Cutting power does nothing reliable for Canada on its own. The price effect is tiny: about 0.5 points of US support at most, because Canadian power is under 1% of US use. What matters is the blackouts.
  2. The outcome depends on who gets blamed for the blackout. If Americans blame their president, the chance the US gives up rises from 33% to 48%. If they blame Canada, it falls to 23%. This belongs to the narrative layer (0.1.21b), not the grid, and it is the same pattern as raids on US soil: harm to American civilians tends to rally the US. The Ontario surcharge drew escalation.
  3. It is a summer weapon, not a winter one. This corrects the roadmap's earlier claim that winter power exports were Canada's biggest lever. Quebec and Ontario need their own power in winter, and Hydro-Québec cut NECEC in the January 2026 cold. The lever is biggest during New York and New England summer heat waves.
  4. Drought shrinks the lever. In a low-water year Canada has little to cut, and BC in particular depends on imports from the US.
  5. A US cut hurts Canada more than a Canadian cut hurts the US. It costs Canada about 1.2 points of extra peak GDP loss and causes ~1.5 winter load-shedding events over five years in coercion. Outcomes still barely move, again because the model links Canadian surrender only weakly to economic pain.
  6. Stacking every economic lever is what moves outcomes. All levers together raise the chance the US gives up under coercion from 33% to 43%. Electricity adds almost nothing to the oil and potash levers.

Weakest parameters

blackout_support_effect (decisive; modeller estimate), blackout_prob, hydro_condition, us_support_drag, can_gdp_weight.

Backlog this opens

  • Make blackout attribution part of the narrative module (0.1.21b), using the same framing variables as the governor shock.
  • Natural gas, the reverse dependency: Ontario and Quebec import about half their gas from the US.
  • US repression and escalation rules (a "National Emergency on Electricity"-style response to a cut).

Sources

Canada Energy Regulator, 2025 Canada–US energy trade snapshot (May 2026) and 2024 snapshot; EIA Today in Energy (20 July and 5 Aug 2026); S&P Global (13 May 2026); ISO-NE market monitor via Acadia Center (Oct 2026); ISO-NE 2025 net energy for load; Hydro-Québec annual report 2024 via Energi Media; Blakes, CBC, Utility Dive on Ontario's March 2025 surcharge; BC Hydro import reporting (Electricity Forum, Global News).