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Roadmap / 0.1.2.7

Supply chains and logistics

Version 0.1.2.7, 11 Nov 2026. tag v0.1.2.7, commit 598ed3b. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.7_logistics.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.

Switch: logistics.enabled (off by default, neutral when off), with sub-switches us_sustainment, caf_sustainment and civilian (all on by default).
Runs: 2,000 per variant, seed 20261105. Complex weather (January start), wildlife, potash, oil and electricity on, no embargoes. Backtests pass; 16 tests pass.

What the module adds (aggregate only; no sites or methods)

A. US sustainment in Canada. - Resistance sabotage and blockade of road and rail cut occupier supply in proportion to resistance strength. - Canada's thin east-west corridors amplify it. The 2020 blockades shut CN's eastern network, about a quarter of its operations. - Winter storms add to it. - Shortfalls cut effective occupier strength. - Canada pays too: the same lines carry Canadian goods. The 2020 blockades were pencilled at ~0.25% of GDP for the month, with Quebec rationing propane on ~1 week of stock.

B. Canadian forces without US resupply. - The OAG (Oct 2026) found "significant gaps" in the strategic ammunition stockpile that will take years to fix. - The former CDS warned stocks would run out "in days in some cases" at Ukraine-like use; NATO asks for 30 days of supply. - Major F-35 maintenance, overhaul and software upgrades happen in the US. - In the model, key munitions run out after 3–15 days of high-intensity combat, after which Canadian effectiveness falls 30–70%. Allied materiel removes about half of that penalty.

C. Civilian supply chains. - Canada loses US food and drugs in proportion to trade disruption: - the US supplied 56.5% of vegetable imports in 2025 and ~36% of fruit; - Canada imports 72% of the vegetables it eats; - the US supplied 30.8% of pharmaceutical imports in 2024. - Substitution builds over 2–6 months. - Both sides take a decaying just-in-time shock, mostly autos and parts. The Ambassador Bridge carries 25–30% of Canada–US trade, and the 2022 blockade shut or slowed plants on both sides within days.

Results (chance the US quits)

Variant Full annexation Alberta detachment Economic coercion
Logistics off 64.4% 47.6% 32.2%
All on 63.3% 50.7% 33.7%
US sustainment only 64.1% 52.2% 32.6%
Canadian forces' sustainment only 63.2% 49.0% 33.1%
Civilian only 65.3% 49.8% 32.3%
Off, allies send materiel 71.7% 66.4% –
All on, allies send materiel 71.0% 65.3% –
Measure (full annexation) Off All on
Peak Canadian GDP loss (median) 21.7% 24.4%
Peak US GDP loss (median) 1.49% 1.77%
Mean occupier supply shortfall 0 12.9% (peak 14.6%)
Share of the conventional campaign Canada fights short of key munitions 0 78%

Findings

  1. Logistics hurts both sides and decides neither. With everything on, the chance the US quits moves by at most 1–3 points in any scenario.
  2. Canada runs out of munitions early, but the conventional phase is already lost. Canada fights ~78% of the campaign short of key munitions. That makes the opening slightly cheaper for the US, but the conventional result doesn't depend on it; the war is decided by the occupation.
  3. Sabotaging supply lines cuts both ways. Interdiction holds occupier strength down ~6% on average, but the same rail lines feed Canadians. Canada pays ~0.25% of GDP for each month of full interdiction, on top of everything else.
  4. Food and drug shortages add ~3 points to Canada's peak economic loss, but surrender barely moves. The model links Canadian capitulation only weakly to economic pain. This is the third version where that link has blunted a Canadian weak spot (Line 5, electricity, now food and drugs). It is the clearest case yet for fixing it in the 0.1.2.0 harness.
  5. Allied materiel matters far more than any logistics setting. It raises the chance the US quits by ~7 points in full annexation and ~16 points in the Alberta detachment. Most of that comes from the existing external-support channel, not from munitions. That is the case for NATO and foreign arms shipments next (0.1.2.8, 0.1.2.8.1).

Weakest parameters

interdiction_coef, shortfall_strength_sensitivity, caf_days_of_supply, caf_ammo_penalty, can_food_pain, can_pharma_pain, the just-in-time shock sizes.

Sources

Auditor General of Canada, Report 24 (Oct 2026), Ammunition for the Canadian Armed Forces; CTV and CBC on the CDS's ammunition warnings; CBC (2025) and 19FortyFive (2025) on F-35 sustainment; Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada field vegetable overview 2025; UBC Canada Food Flows via CBC; federal food blueprint via The Packer (2026); Statistics Canada via CTV (2025) on pharmaceuticals; The Conversation, Fortune and CBC (Feb 2022) on the Ambassador Bridge; Transport Canada (2020), CBC, BNN Bloomberg and Energy Now on the 2020 rail blockades.